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Chris Orescan Orescan: What Was Different This Time?

The chain of events can help us learn

Written by Chris Orescan   
 
 
 
 
 
I was recently asked by a colleague to review the findings from the US National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) regarding the Gulfstream III accident at Houston’s Hobby Airport in November 2004. The accident received much media attention as the pilots had been dispatched to Houston to pick up former President George H.W. Bush. The crew members were both 62 years old, each had over 19,000 hours of experience and both had a G-III type rating. They had most likely flown together on numerous occasions in the same aircraft and flown numerous trips into Hobby airport. I was asked, what was different this time? Why did this happen to this very experienced crew on this particular trip?

The NTSB performed a thorough investigation and its findings were not all that surprising; it concluded that like many accidents, there were a series of factors which led up to this one, and there were a few people who could have prevented it from occurring. The NTSB said the crew failed to adequately monitor and cross-check flight instruments during the approach. Also, the crew failed to select the correct ILS frequency in a timely manner and adhere to approved company approach procedures, including stabilized approach criteria. The first officer informed approach that he had the ATIS but identified the incorrect ATIS identifier; ATC cleared them for the ILS Runway 4 approach “when able;” the first officer acknowledged the clearance and read back that they were cleared for the ILS 14; the controller did not question the incorrect readbacks.

The aircraft was well equipped with dual EFIS displays – that model has a fast/slow indicator which shows the aircraft’s relative airspeed to target airspeed – this was also a contributing factor. The NTSB believes that the crew was following that indicator which looks similar to the G/S indicator when the F/O failed to bring the ILS frequency up from the standby position. Ultimately the aircraft struck a light standard at about 198 feet and 3.25 miles from the Runway 4 threshold, killing all three on board and seriously injuring someone on the ground.

The NTSB’s function is to determine the cause of accidents, including the contributing factors which led up to an accident. And depending on the class of the accident, the other aspects which did or did not play a role may or may not be investigated. However, after doing this exercise I personally believe that the NTSB fundamentally falls short in assisting industry to learn from these mistakes and helping to prevent them from happening again. I believe the NTSB needs to take the investigations much further and include more investigation into why, why today and why this crew? What was different here?

You still need to find the hard evidence and facts which ultimately caused this accident. The remainder requires some degree of speculation; more extensive interviews need to be completed. What was the crew’s state of mind prior to the flight? How was their training? How proficient were they on the aircraft and with its systems? This obviously requires reviewing training records and interviewing training staff and family. How was their last line check or did they even complete one? Was something going on in their personal lives which may have affected their abilities?

As a pilot group we could benefit enormously from finding the reasons and factors which lead to accidents. We need to review attitudes – why did this crew end up in this situation? Did age play a role? How many types did this crew have on their licence? Avionics are becoming more advanced and sophisticated; how proficient were they with this equipment? How often did they shoot approaches to minimums or execute a missed approach from DH (decision height)? Why didn’t they elect to request time to sort things out and get set up properly?

The hard evidence seems to be clear as to what the crew did or did not do, but as a professional group we need to be asking ourselves why and what was different this time. We are seeing an increase in incidents and accidents and with a shortage of pilots and continued hiring, this is only likely to increase. Understanding and identifying how events contributed to the chain is an extremely effective tool to counteract accidents. The skies are getting more crowded, aircraft systems are changing and can be more complicated, and experience levels are decreasing due to pilot shortages. Industry and government need to address these issues now.